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UNDERSTANDING CRUDE OIL TRANSPORT 
STRATEGIES IN NORTH AMERICA1  
S. Joel Carlson, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Joseph M. Sussman, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
On July 6, 2013, an oil-laden unit train derailed and exploded in Lac-
Mégantic, Quebec, killing 47 people and levelling its downtown. 
Following a dramatic increase in crude oil shipments on US Class I 
railroads from just 9,500 carloads in 2008 to 234,000 in 2012  (AAR 
2013), this accident shocked many and led to the significantly 
increased public scrutiny of crude oil by rail (CBR).  
 
Simultaneously, there has been intense scrutiny of several proposed 
pipelines from the oil sands of northern Alberta to the west and east 
coasts of Canada as well as to the US Gulf of Mexico Coast (USGC). 
Pipeline opponents are concerned not only about negative potential 
environmental impacts from the pipelines themselves, such as a spill 
of diluted bitumen (a form of crude oil to be shipped), but also about 
the consequences of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by the 
energy-intensiveness of bitumen production and refining. Proponents 
counter that a denial of pipeline permits by the Canadian and US 
governments would lead to more CBR, which they argue would not 
only be less cost-effective, safe, and environmentally-friendly, but 
also ultimately lead to the same amount of GHG being emitted from 
the production and refining of oil sands bitumen (e.g. Krugel 2013). 
Therefore, much of the debate over proposed pipelines from the oil 
sands hinges on whether railroads could accommodate oil production 
increases economically and with comparable societal impacts.    
 
The stakes are high: oil sands production could increase from 1.8 
million barrels per day (Mb/d) in 2012 to 5.0 Mb/d in 2035, bringing 
along with it both positive and negative impacts for Canada and the 
US. Until these impacts are considered through political and 
regulatory processes in Canada and the US, railroads deciding 
whether to invest in capacity to transport bitumen are presented with 
considerable uncertainty.  
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To provide context for addressing this uncertainty, the first part of 
this paper qualitatively discusses the relative performance of railroads 
versus pipelines along economic, environmental, and safety 
dimensions, relates how this relative performance may affect oil 
sands development, and suggests how the impacts from the 
transportation system and oil sands production fit within the broader 
strategy of the Canadian and US governments. The second part of this 
paper quantitatively addresses the uncertainty faced by the railroads 
using a dynamic programming model, which determines the optimal 
investment capacity investment for the railroad industry as a whole to 
transport bitumen from the Alberta oil sands. The results from this 
model are then related back to the governmental positions discussed 
in the qualitative section.  
 
The governments’ perspectives: a qualitative approach 
 
Three important impacts of oil sands production and its transportation 
system are: economic impacts (and relatedly energy security), GHG 
emissions/climate change impacts, and local environmental impacts. 
After describing each impact, the position of the Canadian and US 
governments related to these impacts will be explained. The federal 
governments of the US and Canada are the focus, because they hold 
authority over pipeline permit approval for interprovincial and 
international pipelines, though provinces and states have some 
jurisdiction over certain aspects of pipeline construction, such as 
pipeline “siting” in the US (Vann et al. 2012, CEAA 2012). The 
relative performance of railroads versus pipelines will then be 
described to understand how the each government could favor one 
mode over the other to accomplish its strategic objectives, and the 
consequences they would need to be aware of. Throughout this 
discussion, uncertainties of interest to both governments and the 
railroads are identified. 
 
Canada would receive significant economic benefits from oil sands 
production growth. Assuming plausible growth, jobs in the oil sands 
could grow from 75,000 jobs (direct, indirect, and induced) in 2010 to 
905,000 jobs in 2035, and over this period, the Government of 
Canada could expect to receive $311 billion in tax revenue (Honarvar 
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et al. 2011). As a result, all major Canadian federal political parties 
support (at least some of) the capacity expansion necessary to support 
oil sands production growth, though the New Democratic Party 
opposes pipelines solely designed to export unprocessed crude oil 
(Canadian Press 2013, Barton 2013).  
 
Production from the oil sands also impacts the economy of the US 
through its trade relationship with Canada, but the magnitude of the 
benefits is a more contentious issue in the US. The oil sands sector 
could contribute to the creation and preservation of 465,000 jobs 
(indirect and induced) in the US in 2035, up from 21,000 in 2010 
(Honarvar et al. 2011), but only some of the benefits are specifically 
tied to Alberta oil ending up in the US. Because oil is globally traded, 
US refiners may be able to import comparably priced oil from abroad 
regardless, although this would not necessarily be from an ally of the 
US (Levi 2009). As a result, the economic impacts in the US of a 
particular energy transport project are more difficult to quantify, 
leaving room for political debate.  
 
For example, in the context of the Keystone XL (KXL) evaluation, 
President Obama has downplayed the economic benefits from the 
project, indicating that its construction would create only 2,000 
construction jobs, lower than the estimate given in the Department of 
State's (DoS’s) Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement 
(DSEIS) of 3,900 person-years in direct construction jobs (The New 
York Times 2013, DoS 2013). By contrast, many in Congress support 
its construction partly because of these same economic impacts 
(Energy and Commerce Committee 2013). Therefore, even when 
considering the more easily defined construction benefits of the KXL, 
there is significant debate over value of the economic benefits 
received from a pipeline project.   
 
Because of the difference in the economic benefits potentially 
received by the Canadian and US governments, there is also 
divergence in their goals. The Canadian government wants a cost-
effective crude oil transport system with sufficient capacity: it prefers 
pipelines, which, as shown in Table 1, are generally a lower cost 
mode. The DoS finds that the total cost of shipping raw bitumen via 
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rail is comparable to that of pipelines, particularly if the perspective 
of small shippers is considered because they are charged higher 
“uncommitted” rates (US DoS 2014). However, this understanding is 
primarily based on estimates at this point, because the use of unit 
trains from Alberta only began in October 2013 (Williams 2013), and 
specialized infrastructure would is needed to support the transport of 
raw bitumen.  
 
Table 1: Logistics cost of bitumen shipping from Alberta to the USGC  
 Rail Pipeline 





Additionally, whether railroads would make the investments 
necessary to transport the expected 3 Mb/d in production growth is 
uncertain. The DoS (2014) finds that such growth would be consistent 
with the capacity expansion that took place to accommodate coal 
production from the Powder River Basin. However, Cairns (2013) 
opines that handling the 3 Mb/d growth is “probably a stretch too far” 
for the railroads. Because of these unresolved questions and their 
greater comfort with pipelines, Canada is in favor of pipelines, even if 
railroads could plausibly handle the traffic competitively. 
 
By contrast, from the US perspective, the desirability of the two 
modes depends on the prioritization of its goals. Specifically, the 
production and refining of crude oil derived from oil sands bitumen 
results in higher GHG emissions as compared to other heavy crudes 
refined in the US by 2 to 13% (DoS 2014). If GHG emissions 
reductions are the priority, then denying pipeline permits may be 
preferable, because rail transport generally appears less economic, 
and its ultimate capacity is uncertain. Notably, analysis for the DoS 
(2014) finds one scenario in which a denial of the KXL would result 
in modestly less production from the oil sands. 
 
However, if reducing GHG emissions were the priority, encouraging 
a GHG-reduction policy in Canada appears to be President Obama’s 
preferred approach: “Canada at the source in those tar sands could 
potentially be doing more to mitigate carbon release” (The NY Times 
2013, emphasis added). However, Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
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downplays the issue: “[emissions from oil sands production are] 
almost nothing globally” (Fitzpatrick 2013). Although Canada has a 
GHG emissions reduction target for 2020, Canada does not have any 
federal policy for GHG emissions reductions from the oil sector. 
Combined with expected oil sands production growth, Canada is 
currently poised to increase carbon emissions from the baseline year 
(2005). Though the US is also not on track to meet the same GHG 
emissions-reduction goal as Canada, Canada’s oil and gas sector is a 
critical component to meeting that goal, because it represents 23% of 
Canadian emissions in 2011 (Demerse and Partington 2013). 
 
The resistance by Canada to implementing carbon constraints, 
particularly when the US president views them as a key priority also 
suggests that there is greater uncertainty over how the incremental 
cost of rail transport could impact oil sands production growth. One 
proposal by The Pembina Institute (an environmentally-inclined think 
tank) for a $150/tonne carbon tax would result in an effective cost of 
$2.87/barrel (Partington et al. 2013), which is well within the price 
differential between pipelines and rail. That the Canadian government 
has not put more modest proposals in place suggests that oil sands 
producers could be more cost sensitive than the DoS concludes.  
 
The choice of transportation modes also affects the amount of GHG 
emissions. While pipelines are generally considered more energy 
efficient and produce fewer GHG emissions than unit trains, some 
research indicates that the opposite may be true. Because the power 
grid in the US Midwest relies on fossil fuels, unit trains may produce 
fewer GHG emissions than pipelines from Alberta to the USGC 
(Tarnoczi 2013). Because these results conflict with the information 
provided by the DoS (2014), more research is needed into the 
lifecycle impacts of the two modes; it should not necessarily be 
assumed that pipelines have lesser impacts in all cases. 
 
The local environmental impacts from the bitumen production have 
not been a critical issue in the debate surrounding transportation 
capacity, unlike the issue over spills from pipelines and railcars. In 
terms of research, Crosby et al. (2013) finds “critical gaps in the 
current oversight, rules and regulations, contingency planning 
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requirements, and response capacity to address the increasing 
transport of oil sands products,” though there is no evidence that the 
transport of bitumen causes more spills (Barteau et al. 2013). Despite 
the concerns, the Canadian Government passed legislation in 2012 to 
give the federal cabinet final decision-making power over whether a 
project subject to environmental reviews proceeds, instead of the 
National Energy Board (NEB), the regulator of interprovincial and 
international pipelines in Canada, which aligns with their overall 
strategy of supporting pipeline development (Hoberg 2013). In the 
US, President Obama has emphasized concerns over GHG, but 
concerns over local environmental impacts are being litigated in state 
courts (Bernstein 2014).  
 
Therefore, transport safety records merit examination. As tabulated in 
Table 3, railroads have a lower spill rate but a higher rate of injury as 
compared to pipelines. Although railroads have a lower spill rate per 
ton-mile than pipelines, they have a higher incident rate than 
pipelines. Therefore, on an environmental-impact basis, railroads 
perform modestly better than pipelines; yet public perception may 
still view railroads as less safe due to their higher incident rate. On a 
public safety basis, railroads have an injury rate 30 times higher than 
pipelines for the transport of petroleum products (though it is not 
clear from the cited report whether these accidents were solely related 
to the transport of the hazardous material) (Furchtgott-Roth 2013). As 
a result, the modal split between pipelines and railroads has safety 
implications, particularly from a public safety perspective.   
 
More importantly, using historical data as a comparison has 
limitations, which is particularly of concern in the case of railroads, 
as they have not previously used unit trains to transport oil. This 
historical data does not include recent accidents involving crude oil, 
particularly the accident at Lac-Mégantic, in which approximately 
38,000 barrels of oil was released (Beaudin 2013), almost double the 
amount of oil released (20,600 barrels) in the largest inland pipeline 
spill in the US (Reuters 2013). The chair of the Transportation Safety 
Board of Canada also emphasizes these concerns: “In this new 
environment, it is no longer enough for industry and government to 
cite previous safety records or a gradual, 20-year decline in the 
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number of main-track derailments” (Tadros 2013). Therefore, public 
safety is an impact that needs to be mitigated if rail is to take a greater 
role in transporting crude oil, and new approaches to identifying 
hazards will be necessary to deal with such a major operational 
change. 
 
Table 3: Historical safety record in transporting crude oil 
Historical averages Rail Pipelines 
Frequency (incident/billion ton-miles) 0.81–2.08 0.58–0.58 
Typical Magnitude (barrels/incident) 16.4 – 65.7 266 – 269 
Spill rate (barrels/million ton-miles) 2.2–3.5 6.3 - 11.3 
Injuries* (incidents per billion ton-miles) 0.1925 0.0068 
*Requiring hospitalization. Results only available from Furchtgott-Roth (2013). 
Sources: AAR (2013), Furchtgott-Roth (2013) 
 
Ultimately, whether President Obama, with the aim of reducing GHG 
emissions, justifies denying pipeline permits because it may constrain 
oil sands production is a value judgment in a political context. If he 
does so, he should also address the rail safety implications in his 
policies. However, because the performance of railroads is 
comparable to pipelines (though uncertain) along some dimensions 
economic and societal importance, the consequences of denying 
pipeline permits on GHG emissions, economic, and other 
environmental impacts are not as great as often presented in the 
political debate. As President Obama’s deliberations unfold, as well 
as the evaluation process for pipelines in Canada, railroads are 
presented with considerable uncertainty, the implications of which on 
both the railroads, and by extension, governments, are now studied. 
 
The railroads’ perspective: a dynamic programming model 
 
A dynamic program is used to determine if and when railroads would 
invest in capacity to transport crude oil from Alberta to the USGC (a 
representative destination). The problem horizon is 20 years starting 
in 2014. In total, there are five two-year periods and a final 10-year 
period. All values assumed in the analysis are given in Table 9. 
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The objective of railroads is to maximize profit, 𝜋, (in $ million) over 
all periods. As provided in equation (1), profit in a given time period 𝑡 is defined as the transportation rate per million barrels (𝑅) minus the 
variable transportation cost per million barrels (𝑉𝐶) multiplied by the 
amount of crude oil shipped by rail in million barrels (𝐹𝐷!) over the 
time period (i.e. 365×2  in the case of the first five time periods), 
minus the capital cost incurred (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!).  
 𝜋 = 𝜋!!∈! = 𝑅 − 𝑉𝐶 365×2 𝐹𝐷! − CapCost!!  (1) 
 
If such pipeline capacity were available to a destination, it is assumed 
that oil shippers would rather ship by pipeline. Therefore, as given in 
equation (2), fulfilled daily demand by rail (𝐹𝐷!) is the minimum of 
the rail capacity (𝑅𝐶!) that exists at the beginning of a given state, and 
the oil sands supply (𝑂𝑆𝑆!) that exceeds pipeline capacity (𝑃𝐿𝐶!). Oil 
sands supply and pipeline capacity are stochastic. All units are in 
millions of barrels per day (Mb/d). 
 𝐹𝐷! = min max 𝑂𝑆𝑆! − 𝑃𝐿𝐶! , 0 ,𝑅𝐶!    (2) 
 
The capital cost (in $ million), given in equation (3), is the sum the 
infrastructure investment cost (𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!) and the locomotive purchase 
costs (𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!). The factors used to convert rail capacity investment 
actions (𝑑𝑅𝐶!, in million barrels per day) into these respective costs 
are given in Table 9.  This analysis assumes that the railroad 
companies are currently operating at their infrastructure and 
locomotive capacity limit, and thus transporting oil would require an 
immediate investment. 
 CapCost! = LCost! + ICCost!             (3)  
 
The dynamic programming problem value function (in $ million) 
used in time periods 1 through 5 is given by equation (4). The value 
function represents the best possible present value of expected profits 
that the railroads could achieve, given current railroad capacity at 
time 𝑡 and optimal capacity investments in all future periods. The 
expected value (i.e. 𝐸 … ) accounts for the future variability of 
pipeline capacity and oil sands supply. In essence, the value function 
at time period 𝑡 (𝑉!) is expressed as a trade-off between immediate 
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and discounted future rewards. The value function is calculated 
recursively starting with the last time period and working backwards. 
 𝑉! 𝑅𝐶! ,𝑃𝐿𝐶! ,𝑂𝑆𝑆! = max!"!! 𝑅 − 𝑉𝐶 𝐹𝐷! − 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 1 +𝑑𝑟 !!(𝐸 𝑉!!! 𝑅𝐶!!!,𝑃𝐿𝐶!!!,𝑂𝑆𝑆!!! ) ,∀𝑡 = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5  (4) 
 
Equation (4) is used for the first five time periods; the value function 
for the last 10-year time period (𝑡 = 6) is provided by equation (5). 
This equation assumes that the annual profit the railroads receive is 
an annuity throughout the time period and dependent on the railroad 
capacity, pipeline capacity, and the oil sand supply at the beginning 
of the period. The annuity is converted to a present value at the start 
of the period using a present value factor. 
 𝑔 𝑅𝐶! ,𝑃𝐿𝐶! ,𝑂𝑆𝑆! = 𝑅 − 𝑉𝐶 𝐹𝐷! 365 !! !!!" !!"!" , 𝑡 = 6    (5) 
 
The maximum possible railroad capacity (including infrastructure and 
locomotives) expansion (𝑑𝑅𝐶!) in one period was assumed to be 0.6 
Mb/d in 0.2 Mb/d increments. This value was selected to correspond 
with the maximum possible oil sands expansion, but is also plausible 
based on experience from the Bakken-formation region, where rail 
traffic increased by about 0.4 Mb/d between 2012 and 2013 (AAR 
2013). Assuming that this trend could continue, the capacity 
expansion would be 0.8 Mb/d over a two-year period. 
 
Table 4 presents the oil sand supply probability mass function (PMF) 
used for all periods (i.e. the probability [𝑃!!""] of a possible growth in 
oil sands supply [𝜔!!""] in any period), an approximation of the low, 
reference, and high oil sand production forecasts from the NEB 
(2013). It is assumed that oil sands supply in the subsequent time 
period cannot exceed the crude oil transportation capacity, as given 
by equation (6). 
 𝑂𝑆𝑆!!! = min 𝑂𝑆𝑆! + 𝜔!!"", 𝑃𝐿𝐶! + 𝜔!!" + 𝑅𝐶! + 𝑑𝑅𝐶!   (6) 
 
Table 4: Probability mass function for oil sands supply. 𝝎𝒕𝑶𝑺𝑺 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 (Mb/d) 𝑃!!"" 	   0.0 0.1 0.8 0.1 ∀𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 
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Possible pipeline expansion projects are listed in Table 5. The 
probabilities that these pipelines are approved or not approved are 
assigned using judgment based on (1) the discussion in the first 
section of this paper, and (2) the understanding of the decision-
making authority of Canadian and US governments regarding 
pipelines. The selection of probabilities is also guided by a 
framework proposed by Hoberg (2013) used to characterize the 
political risks of pipeline approvals. Because the PMF relies on 
judgment, three scenarios, “low”, “base” and “high” were considered. 
 
Table 5: Possible pipeline capacity expansion in time periods 1 and 2. 
Pipelines Capacity (b/d) 
Require US approval; decision expected in period 1 1,180,000 
 Enbridge Alberta Clipper (AC) (Phase 1) 120,000 
 Enbridge Alberta Clipper (AC) (Phase 2) 230,000 
 TransCanada Keystone XL (KXL) 830,000 
Require Canadian approval; decision expected in period 2 2,215,000 
 Enbridge Northern Gateway (NG) 525,000 
 Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Expansion (TMX) 590,000 
 TransCanada Energy East (EE) 1,100,000 
 
The decisions in period 1 are subjected to the uncertainty of whether 
President Obama will approve approximately total 1.2 Mb/d of 
capacity from Canada to the US. Possible increments of pipeline 
capacity (𝜔!!"#) in period 1 and their associated probability (𝑃!!"#) are 
given in Table 6 for “low”, “base”, and “high” scenarios.  
 
Table 6: PMF of pipeline capacity expansion, period 1.  𝝎𝟏𝑷𝑳𝑪 0.0 1.2 (Mb/d) 𝑃!!"# 	   0.6 0.4 (low) 𝑃!!"#  0.4 0.6 (base) 𝑃!!"# 	   0.2 0.8 (high) 
 
In time period 2, it is uncertain whether the Canadian government 
will approve up to 2.4 Mb/d of capacity. Possible increments of 
pipeline capacity in period 2 (𝜔!!"#) and their associated probability 
(𝑃!!"#) are given in Table 7 for “low”, “base”, and “high” scenarios. 
 
A priori, the “base” scenario PMF seems reasonable given current 
knowledge. These probabilities were determined by assuming a 
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probability of approval for each of the Canadian pipelines, listed in 
Table 8, and using a probability tree to determine the probability of 
each increment of capacity expansion being approved from zero to 
2.4 Mb/d. While the current Conservative party government is 
supportive of pipeline projects, because the next federal election is 
upcoming in 2015, the results of the next election will ultimately 
impact the approval of specific pipelines proposed entirely within 
Canada. Therefore, it is plausible that no pipeline capacity is 
developed or that all the proposed capacity develops, with assigned 
probabilities of 0.14 and 0.21, respectively. It also seems reasonable 
that the most likely eventuality is that 1.2 Mb/d of pipeline per day 
develops, which this corresponds to the capacity of the EE pipeline or 
the sum of the NG and TMX pipelines. The “low” and “high” 
scenario PMFs also seem like reasonable bookends of possible 
distributions. Therefore, even though the PMFs rely on judgment, the 
range provided reflects currently available information. 
 
Table 7: PMF of pipeline capacity expansion, period 2.  𝝎𝟐𝑷𝑳𝑪 0.0 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4 (Mb/d) 𝑃!!"# 	   0.378 0.132 0.342 0.088 0.060 (low) 𝑃!!"#  0.140 0.120 0.350 0.180 0.210 (base) 𝑃!!"# 	   0.030 0.044 0.246 0.176 0.504 (high) 
 
Table 8: Probabilities assigned to Canadian pipeline expansion.  
 Approval probability Comments 
Low Base High 
 NG 0.3 0.5 0.7 
This pipeline involves construction of a 
new right-of-way (ROW) through rugged 
terrain, and there is significant local and 
First Nations opposition to it.  
 TMX 
Given NG approved: This pipeline uses existing ROW and the 
permitting decision will follow the NG; 
therefore, there is likely correlation 
between the two decisions. 
0.5 0.7 0.9 
Given NG denied: 
0.1 0.3 0.5 
EE 0.4 0.6 0.8 
This pipeline will use an existing natural 
gas pipeline for much of the route, and 
there appears to be fairly broad support for 
this proposal. However, the proposal is the 
least well scrutinized to date. 
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Results and discussion 
 
Figure 1 contains the optimal policy matrices – the mapping between 
the state in period 𝑡 and the best capacity investment action to take – 
calculated for the “base” assumptions. The matrices for time periods 
1 (2014), 2 (2016), and 3 (2018) are stacked vertically, and for 
pipeline capacities of 0.0 and 1.2 Mb/d are arranged horizontally. 
Within each policy matrix, the rows correspond with the railroad 
capacity (RC) and the columns correspond with the oil sands supply 
that exists that exists at the beginning of the corresponding time 
period. The cells contain the optimal railroad capacity investment. 
 
 
Figure 1: Policy matrices for the “base” scenario (Mb/d). 	  
Assuming that railroads are operating at capacity, the results imply 
that they should not invest in capacity in 2014 (t = 1), nor in 2016 (t = 
2), even if the KXL and AC are not approved. Railroads should only 
invest in capacity in 2018 (t = 3) if pipelines are nearing capacity, 
which implies that in the absence of uncertainty, the market is 
lucrative for railroads. Of course, there are going to be some specific 
geographic markets not served by pipelines in which rail transport is 
desirable regardless of whether pipelines are approved, which the 
model does not account for. However, on the whole, the base results 
suggest railroads should be cautious in terms of making any long-
term capacity investments in competition with pipelines.  
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Figure 2 compares the policy matrices for the “low” (left) and “high” 
(high) scenarios. Only under a scenario in which there are low 
probabilities of pipeline approvals should railroads begin investing in 
capacity in periods t = 1 and t = 2. The results suggest that 0.4 Mb/d 
of capacity could be invested now (in 2014), and an additional up to 
0.4 Mb/d could be invested in 2016, depending on oil sands supply 
growth; if growth were large in period 1, then more railroad capacity 
could built in period 2.  	  
 
Figure 2: Policy matrices for “low” and “high” scenarios (Mb/d). 	  
There is also sensitivity to capital costs. If capital costs were lower 
than the assumed values by 25%, then it is optimal for railroads to 
invest 0.4 Mb/d in time period 1, presumably because there would be 
time to recoup the capital costs before any pipelines are built. If the 
capital costs were in fact 50% lower than predicted, then a similar 
policy to what applies in the “low” probability case would apply.  
 
Collectively, this analysis reveals that in the short term (until 
uncertainty over pipeline permit approvals is resolved), railroads 
should be cautious about making significant investment decisions for 
routes where they would be in direct competition with pipelines, 
unless capacity investments are relatively inexpensive. The risk that 
the pipelines could be approved dominates the fact that the market 
would be lucrative for the railroads in the absence of uncertainty. 
However, if railroads have low-cost capacity expansions available to 
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them, then it is optimal for them to start transporting oil now, as there 
is more certainty that they can recoup lower capital costs. 
 
For governments, these results suggest that any hesitation by the 
railroads in transporting crude oil is partly as a result of the 
uncertainty over pipeline approval. From the perspective of President 
Obama, this uncertainty may be desirable in terms of slowing down 
possible production expansion in the oil sands, thus decreasing GHG 
emissions. It also maintains pressure on the Canadian government to 
implement its own federal policy to manage GHG emissions in the oil 
and gas sector. From the Canadian perspective, they wish to remove 
this uncertainty by approving proposed pipelines as soon as possible.  
 
Table 9: Parameter values used in the dynamic programming model. 
Parameter	   Value	  Car	  cycle	  time,	  CCT	   21	  daysa	  Rate,	  R	   $ 10.88/barrels	  b	  Variable	  Cost,	  VC	   1/1.8	  of	  rate	  c	  Cars	  per	  train,	  CPT	   100	  cars	  Car	  capacity,	  CC	   525	  barrels/car	  d	  Tank	  car	  gross	  weight,	  TCGW	   286,000	  lb/car	  Horsepower	  per	  locomotive,	  HPPL	   4400	  hp	  Horsepower	  per	  trailing	  ton,	  HPT	   0.6	  hp/ton	  Average	  length	  of	  haul,	  ALoH	   2485	  miles	  e	  Infrastructure	  capacity	  unit	  cost,	  CI	   $1.8	  million/	  train/day/100	  milesf	  Locomotive	  unit	  cost,	  CL	   $2	  million/	  locomotive	  g	  Trains	  per	  unit	  of	  capacity,	  NT	   1/(𝐶𝐶×𝐶𝑃𝑇)	  	  Locomotives	  per	  train,	  LPT	   ⌈(𝐶𝑃𝑇)(𝑇𝐶𝐺𝑊)(𝐻𝑃𝑇)/𝐻𝑃𝑃𝐿⌉	  Total	  locomotive	  costs,	  𝐿𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! 	   𝐶𝐿 𝐶𝐶𝑇 𝑁𝑇 𝐿𝑃𝑇 𝑑𝑅𝐶! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Total	  infrastructure	  capacity	  cost,	  𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! 	   𝐶𝐼 𝐴𝐿𝑜𝐻 100 𝑁𝑇 𝑑𝑅𝐶! 2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Discount	  rate,	  dr	   11%	  h	  aThe travel time from Alberta to the USGC is 8-10 days by rail (Carey 2013); bUS 
DoS (2014), p. 2.2-30; cThe maximum rate that a railroad can charge without review 
by the Surface Transportation Board (STB); dCairns (2013); dThe rail distance from 
Lloydminster, SK to Port Arthur, TX (US DoS 2014); fLai and Barkan (2009) 
calculate the approximate cost of capacity using sidings for a typical 100-mile long 
subdivision; gHagerty and Linebaugh (2012); hSTB’s cost of capital for railroads in 
2012 (Progressive Railroading 2013). 
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Conclusions 
 
This paper finds that a more holistic study of the performance of 
railroads and pipelines for crude oil transport provides a deeper 
understanding of possible strategies. In the short term, railroads 
should be cautious about investing in capacity until pipeline permit 
decisions are made. President Obama could thus maintain uncertainty 
over pipeline approvals to reduce GHG emissions and to pressure the 
Canadian government to implement an oil and gas sector GHG-
reductions policy. The current Canadian government strategy is to 
mitigate this uncertainty through the approval of pipelines, though 
uncertainty over their approval will likely remain until after the 
federal election in 2015.  
 
In the long term, if pipeline permits are denied, the dynamic 
programming model suggests that capacity investments are lucrative 
for railroads. If, as a result, governments rely more on rail 
transportation, the mitigation of public safety impacts would need to 
be prioritized. However, because the performance of railroads is 
comparable (though uncertain) to pipelines along some dimensions 
economic and societal importance, the consequences of denying 
pipelines on GHG emissions, economic, and other environmental 
impacts are not as great as often presented in the political debate. 
Therefore, greater emphasis should be on efforts to improve the 
overall system, such as implementing appropriate safety or climate 
policies, rather than debating the merits of a particular mode. 
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